Citizens of all four nations of the United Kingdom were failed by politicians and officials who failed to properly prepare for a pandemic or other civil emergency. Former UK health secretaries Jeremy Hunt and Matt Hancock have not updated or improved an inadequate pandemic strategy from 2011, which targeted flu rather than a new virus. Resources that did exist were “constrained” by funding and diverted to Brexit planning after 2018. Ministers were guilty of groupthink and did not effectively use external experts or challenge scientific advice. The possibility of a curtailment was never seriously considered. Nor has sufficient attention been paid to the likely impact of a pandemic on vulnerable groups.
This highly critical conclusions from the first module of the Covid investigation is a landmark moment in the process of national reckoning overseen by Heather Hallett. It is the first time that relatives of the 230,000 people who have died from Covid have endorsed their anger at official failures, both before and during the pandemic, in such an authoritative way.
Lady Hallett’s six-month deadline for replies to her 10 recommendations create a tight timeline for the new government and the devolved administrations. A decision by Sir Keir Starmer on whether to accept her central proposal, for a new, independent statutory body, is expected soon. It is expected that he will follow up on these and other recommendations, including the creation of a UK-wide civil emergency strategy, to be reviewed every three years.
Focused on resilience and preparedness, this report is the clearest indicator yet of Lady Hallett’s approach to her mammoth task. With eight modules remaining, and more to be announced, these findings and recommendations are the first of many. Previous mistakes are acknowledged, along with those who are responsible. Of particular concern is the inability of politicians to respond effectively to unfolding events, change course and challenge advice. Lady Hallett calls for an end to “the culture of consensus in which orthodoxy is entrenched”. But there is more emphasis on systems than individuals. The focus is on what needs to change and how.
The investigation process is labor intensive; the government department tasked with responding to it has 265 staff members. But Lady Hallett is clear that the response from the UK government and devolved administrations must be swift. Another pandemic is likely in the near to medium future, and another virus may be more transmissible and deadly than Covid-19. Unless an understanding of what went wrong is quickly absorbed, the opportunity to prevent similar mistakes from being repeated may be lost.
The report acknowledges that the health and care systems were “operating close to, if not beyond, capacity when the pandemic hit. But while a finding that both are underfunded is likely implicit in such findings, Lady Hallett steers clear of direct criticism of political decisions about public spending. It has understandable disappointed some members from the Covid-19 Bereaved Families for Justice UK group, and other critics of previous governments. But the report is not, and should not be confused with, an exemption. The scale of the issues being considered is huge, and Lady Hallett is determined that her inquiry’s recommendations must be heeded. At a time when a new government is faced with multiple public policy challenges, including a prison crisis, this pragmatic and purposeful document is a solid building block.
